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CASENOTES

TAXATION - MEDICAL DEDUCTION
TRAVEL EXPENSES
The taxpayer, upon the advice of his physician, traveled to a warmer
climate to improve and alleviate his poor health due to a stroke. His
wife's companionship was also advised. On a joint return, expenses of
travel, room and meals for both the taxpayer and his wife were disallowed
by the commissioner. Suit was brought by the taxpayer to recover the
amount paid on the deficiency assessment for the year 1949. Held, the
expense of room and meals incurred by both the taxpayer and his wife,
and the transportation expense of the taxpayer, are deductible as medical
expenses. Enzbry's Estate v. Gray, 143 F. Supp. 603 (W.D.Ky. 1956).
Medical expenses - more specifically, expenses incurred while sojourning to a different climate or environment for reasons of physical enhancement- have been the subject of much uncertainty and vague delineation.
Since 1942, when the medical deduction first appeared' on the federal
income tax scene, cases and rulings, although scant,2 have made evident
the problems of distinguishing between the legitimate motive, presented by
most cases, and motive based upon the attractiveness of having the government, by tax deduction, subsidize a vacation.
The decision in the instant case is an unusually liberal interpretation
of the medical deduction provision of the 1939 code. Added significance
may be given to this holding when considered in the light of the express
legislative 3 and administrative 4 policy and the provisions of the 1954 code 5
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the case and statutory material
in regard to expenses incurred during trips for so-called health reasons and
the significance of the principal case in the light of this development.
1. Section 23 of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, as amended in 1942, provided:
In computing net income there shall be allowed deductions: . . . (x) Aledical, dental, etc. expenses. Expenses paid dnring the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his
spouse, or a dependent specified in § 25 (b) (3) . ..The term "medical
care," as used in this subsection, shall include amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose
of affecting any structure or function of the body ...
2. Eight cases and rulings, only two of which were appealed to, and resolved, in
the Circuit Court. Stringham v. Commissioner, 12 TC 580, aff'd 183 F.2d 579 (6th
Cir. 1949) and Oehs v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 827 (1952).
3.Hearings of the Senate Finance Committee on 1I.R. 8300, 83rd Congress, 2nd
Session, Part 1,p. 24.
4. Proposed U.S. Treas. Rcg. § 1.213-1 (e) (iv) and (v). See text preceding
note 17 infra.
5. Section 213 (e) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code provides:
(1) The term "Medical care" means amounts paid(A) for the diagnosis, care. mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,
or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body (including amounts paid for .. .health insurance) or
(B) for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care referred to
in subparagraph (A) ....
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Prior to the enactment in 1942 of Section 23(x), medical expcnses
fell within the category of nondeductible personal cxpenses. 7 Due to the
pressure of rising individual tax rates growing out of-the exigencies of war,
a genuine need for the relief of taxpayers suffering from extraordinary
medical expensrss was created. Section 23 (x) was enacted, and although
amended in part, the subsection here involved remained unchanged until
1954. The definition of "medical care" under the 1942 amendment of the
1939 code provided that:
*

. . medical care . . . shall include amounts paid for the

diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,
or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body . . .
This definition was broad enough to relieve the burden of almost any
kind, type or description of medical expenditure. By the same token, the
opportunity was presented for tax avoidance by those attributing a medical
motive to a trip induced primarily by motives other than medical and
primarily for pleasure.
In order to keep the deduction within the confines of its purpose,
the courts, in the few decisions involving the point, set out a number of
tests. These tests, although often helpful, are not always applicable. Some
of the most notable are: the motive or purpose of the taxpayer (the
expenditure must be incurred primarily for the prevention or mitigation
of a particular physical or mental defect); 0 the justification of such motive
or purpose (whether the trip was taken upon the advice of a physician);"
the proximity of time between the onset, recurrence, or continuance of the
disease or condition and the treatment or care. 2 lowever, even with these
tests and in view of the essentially factual nature of the problem, the distinction between deductible and nondeductible medical expenses is not
as clear cut as it might be.
It was held prior to the 1954 code that if a trip was shown to have

6. See note, I supra.
7. Bourne v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1933) (involving lawyer's medical expenses).
8. "This allowance is recommended inconsideration of the heavy tax burden that
must be borne by individuals during the existing emergency and of the desirability of
maintaining the present high level of public moral." S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1942).
9. Stringham v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 580, aff'd. 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1949);
Ilavey v. Commissioner, 12 TC 409 (1949).
10. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (x) - I (d) (I). Travel and related expenses incurred for the general health of an individual do not qualify as medical expenses; they are primarily personal expenses for which no deduction is allowed.
It. Havey v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 409 (1949). However, note that not every
expenditure prescribed by a doctor is to be classed as a medical expense. E.g., Semour v.
Commissioner, 14 T. C. 1111 (1950).
12. See note 9 supra.
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been motivated by, and primarily for, the mitigation, alleviation, cure, etc.
of a taxpayer's poor health, travel expenses, including food and lodging
during the entire length of the trip, were deductible. 1'3 Consequently, even
assuming that the trip was for. legitimate medical reasons, many purely
personal expenses could be tacked on the bill. (It is well to note that
in no case has a taxpayer been allowed to deduct the food and lodging
expenses incurred by his spouse or a companion where is was not
14
shown that such company was absolutely necessary for his care or health.
The significance of this factor will be exemplified later).
The shortcomings of this situation were generally recognized and
brought to a head in 1954 when President Eisenhower recommended in
his budget message, " ...to avoid abuses in medical deduction, . . . the
definition of medical expenses [should] be tightened to exclude both ordinary household supplies and indirect travel expenses."' 5 Shortly thereafter,
the president's recommendation was adopted in the 1954 code. Section
213 (e)16 explicitly, provides that only amounts paid primarily for transportation that are essential to medical care shall be deductible, thus excluding
expenses for meals and lodging incidental to such transportation. Furthermore, a proposed revenue regulation' 7 points out that an amount allowable
as a deduction for transportation shall not include the cost of any meals
and lodging while the taxpayer is away from home receiving medical treatment. For returns filed after 1954 there appears to be no question as to
the nondeductibility of expenses for meals and lodging incurred during a
trip.
The court, in the instant case, took the unusual position of giving
the medical deduction provision of the 1939 code a more liberal construction
than in any previous case, in spite of the express legislative and administrative intent under the 1954 code (of which the court was undoubtedly
aware) to restrict and limit the provision. It was not argued, nor could
it reasonably have been substantiated, that the presence of the taxpayer's
wife was essential to the cure, prevention or alleviation of his condition. s
However, the court, solely on the grounds that a reputable physician "advised
that her being with her busbang in Florida 'was advisable'" allowed the

13. Walkins v. Commissioner, 13 TCM 320 (1954); Duff v. Commissioner, 12

TCM 1305 (1953); Stringham v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 580, aff'd. 183 F.2d 579 (6th
Cir. 1949).

Disallowed: Dabkin v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 886 (1952).

14. If it is necessary for one of the parents to accompany the child because of its
physical condition and immaturity, reasonable expenses incurred for travel of the parent
are also deductible as medical expenses. I.T. 3786, 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 75 (1946).
15. The N.Y. Times, January 22, 1954, § 2, p. 14.
16. See note 5 supra.
17. See note 4 supra.
18. "It is significant that Mr. Embry did not see a physician while in Florida, was
able to swim, lounge on the beach and on one occasion at least to play golf." Embry's
Estate, 143 F. Supp. 603, 605 (W.D. Ky. 1956).
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taxpayer to deduct all the expenses incurred for her meals and lodging
and a "reasonable amount for incidental expenses."
The significance of this decision lies in its liberal construction of the
medical deduction provision of the 1939 code on the part of the district
courts in the sixth circuit.' 9 Furthermore, it supports the proposition generally accepted that the district courts favor a more liberal construction
of the revenue code than the Tax Court.20 . However, since no cases involving the item of transportation essential to medical care and having application
under the 1954 code have been reported, one can reasonably assume that the
decisions and rules set forth in the cases decided under the 1939 code will
be applicable. The principal case seems to go far in finding that the trip
taken by the taxpayer and his wife was primarily for the alleviation and
cure of the taxpayer's stroke. Under the present tax law the problem, in
this regard, is essentially the same. Taxpayers might certainly be justified
in claiming the deduction here involved whenever possible.
CARL
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C.

PAFFENDORP

UNREASONABLE INVESTIGATION
RIGHT OF PRIVACY

-

A workmen's compensation claimant brought suit against the compensation carrier and a detective agency employed to investigate the claim.
It was alleged that the claimant suffered damages due to mental distress
caused by the unreasonable mamicr in which investigations were conducted.
The action was dismissed and plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed, the investigative activities, if unreasonable, constituted an invasion of the right of
privacy. Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 38 So.2d 716 (La. 1956).
Since the right of privacy was not recognized at the old common law,
the courts that have considered the question have been absorbed in deciding
whether such a right exists. It was not until 1904 that a state court of last
resort, in Pavesich v. New England Life Inc. Co.,' perceived that a person
had a legal right "to be let alouc' 2 - a purely personal right 3 unsupported
19. Generally, district courts follow the previous decisions of other courts in the
same circuit but are not bound by the decisions rendered in other circuits.
20. Both courts have original jurisdiction over tax questions. The taxpayer has the
choice of contesting the disputed tax assessment in the tax Court before paying the

assessment, or paying the assessment and bringing his suite in the District Court for a
refund. (Originally the tax court was an administrative board, but although still techni-

cally a board, has since acquired the character, respect and dignity of a true court).

1. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1904).
2. CooLr, ToRTs, 2d Ed., 29 (1888).
3. The definition most frequently quoted by the courts appears in 41 Az.JuR.,
Privacy, § I1 (1939). "In order to constitute an invasion of the right of privacy, an act
must be of such a nature as a reasonable man could see might and probably would cause
mental distress and injury to anyone possessed of ordinary feelings and intelligence, situated in like cimcumstances as the complainant, and this question is to some extent
one of law."

